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Property marketa b s t r a c t
This paper applies the ecological modernization (EM) framework to analyze China’s green building pro-
gram. EM focuses on the effective institutionalization of environmental objectives into respective politi-
cal and economic systems, and thus provides valuable insights into the roles of the state and other stake
holders in environmental regulation. Since the mid-2000s, the Chinese government has advanced an
aggressive green building campaign, which is distinguished by its speed, scale, and evolution from one
of voluntary participation to a top-down implementation through administrative hierarchies. While this
has resulted in a remarkable growth of green building projects, questions remain about the effectiveness
and sustainability of such a state-centered approach. Though interviews with officials, planners, archi-
tects, real estate developers, and property managers in several Chinese cities, data analysis of the green
building stock, and surveys of architects, this paper analyzes Chinese green building patterns and situates
such patterns among the contradictory motivations of different levels of government and their relation-
ships to different stake holders. This research finds that the top-down state apparatus is not sufficient to
overcome these contradictions and the profit motives of the property developers. However, many under-
developed opportunities exist to leverage property developers, building professionals, and the public to
engage in green building practices. In the end, I argue that the state must embrace reform to build flexible
and collaborative movements with other parties with strong public participation. China’s ecological mod-
ernization process may feature a stronger state and faster changes, but it is not exempted from the need
of political modernization.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
2013 was a disastrous year for China’s environment. Beginning
in January, Beijing and large parts of northern China experienced
record levels of air pollution, dubbed by the New York Times as
an ‘‘airpocalypse” Wong (2013). The most dangerous particle,
PM2.5, was measured to have a concentration of 700 mg per cubic
meter, while the WHO standard is less than 25 mg (Economist,
2013). Later that year, similar episodes were repeated at the north-
ern city Harbin and the southern Yangtze River Delta. Alarms also
sounded over the conditions of rivers, ground water, and farm soil
throughout China. The Chinese state found itself struggling to cope
with the international criticism and public outcry regarding its
environmental record.The irony is that the Chinese government has made major
efforts to build environmental institutions since the 1980s. For
example, China established environmental protection agencies at
the national and local levels, issued countless pieces of environ-
mental legislation, signed international treaties, and, more recent-
ly, invested more than any other country in clean technology
(Shapiro, 2012). Yet, environment conditions continue to worsen.
Scholars fault China’s environmental governance as the root of
the problem. For the past 30 years, China has prioritized economic
development, which has created contradicting incentives at the
central and local levels, leading to a persistent weakness in envi-
ronmental law enforcement. The limits on information transparen-
cy and the general restrictions on – and even retributions for –
public participation, have also led to weak public awareness and
monitoring (Economy, 2004; Shapiro, 2012; Carter and Mol,
2007). While it is apparent that China’s environmental governance
requires an overhaul, the complexity of such governance and its
2 Y. Zhou / Geoforum 61 (2015) 1–12interplay with many other spheres of China’s economic and social
life suggest an enormous and complex undertaking.
In this regard, ecological modernization (EM)–a theoretical
framework that emerged from studies on political and environ-
mental practices in Northern and Western Europe in the 1980s-
provides valuable directions for reform. EM focuses on the effective
institutionalization of environmental objectives into their respec-
tive political economic systems, involving the roles of technology,
state, economic incentives, and public participation (Mol and
Buttel, 2002; Milanez and Bührs, 2007)
This paper examines the potential of applying EM to understand
China’s green buildings (GBs) program. The EM framework has
been used to analyze China’s environmental governance (Carter
and Mol, 2007), and China’s eco-city development (Caprotti,
2014; Chang and Sheppard, 2013; De Jong et al., 2013; Pow and
Neo, 2013; Chien, 2013). While most Chinese eco-cities are still
in various stages of construction, its official GB program has been
in operation since 2006. As a component of the eco-city concept,
China’s GB program offers an excellent vehicle to examine environ-
mental governance, as it represents an interface of many different
stake holders – different levels of governments, planners, develop-
ers, architectural designers, engineers, builders, and users (owners
or tenants) – and it is riddled with powerful and vested interests
(Zhou and Cai, 2014).
Globally, GBs are key to reducing the carbon footprint and
pollution of the built environment. China’s staggering building
boom – the World Bank (2007) estimates that half of the world’s
new construction would take place in China until at least 2015 –
means that GBs in China will have profound global implications.
GBs are also linked with public health, as the most severe air pol-
lution episodes occur during the winter heating seasons.
China’s GB program started in the early 2000s, initially as a gov-
ernmental collaboration with foreign architects, non-government
organizations (NGOs) and foreign governments. In 2006, it became
a national project and an indispensable component of China’s
international pledge to reduce its carbon intensity. From several
demonstration projects in the early 2000s, the number of GB pro-
jects in China grew to 2500 by the end of 2013, totaling over
143 million m2in gross floor space.1 Although at that time GBs still
constituted only a tiny fraction of China’s total building stock, the
government has a target for GBs to comprise 20% of new construc-
tion by 2020. This large-scale effort also means that China could
be on track to have half of the world’s GB floor space by 2020
(Qiu, 2013). Compared to other GB programs around the world,
China’s program is distinguished by its massive scale and rapid evo-
lution from a voluntary experiment to a program with a top-down
implementation through an administrative hierarchy within just a
few years. It raises questions about the effectiveness and sustain-
ability of relying on the state bureaucracy to enforce environmental
initiatives.
In advanced capitalist societies, the environmental governances
in recent decades have been shaped by contestations and compro-
mises of the state responding to public pressure and an overriding
growth narrative under neoliberalism. Harvey (2010) argues that
the capital accumulation necessitates a ‘‘spatial fix,” which can
be performed in part by a new developmental paradigm. The term
‘‘sustainability fix” was coined by While et al. (2004), drawing
attention to the selective incorporation of ecological goals in urban
governance to service growth in post-industrial cities. China’s eco-
city programs show similar tension because the state mandates
from the top are often underwritten into the development1 Based on the MOHURD issued report, May, 2013, available at http://www.gbmap.
org/article1.php?id=1035. The total is 76 million. This total also includes the total
LEED area in China, reported as 67 million available at http://www.usgbc.org/
articles/heading-back-china.priorities by the local governments (Pow and Neo, 2013). Yet, Chi-
na’s urban governance differs from western ones in its dominant
and relatively autonomous central state without credible opposi-
tion; an underdeveloped codification of state-business relations
and, thus, plenty of room for corruption; and a general lack of
channels for public participation. Within this context, the state
behavior may be influenced by forces different from the global
discourse of neoliberalism, as assumed in the ‘‘sustainability fix”
thesis. A closer scrutiny of the bureaucracy is necessary to discern
the policy practices and alternatives. Given that China’s GB gover-
nance is still very young and in a state of flux, there are opportuni-
ties to build more a collaborative framework in an uniquely
Chinese EM model.Green building and ecological modernization
Ecological modernization theory (EM) emerged from the
debates on capitalism, sustainability, and the state dating back to
the 1980s. Unlike neo-Marxist scholars such as O’Connor (1994),
Schnaiberg (1980), and Harvey (2010) who view capitalism as a
fundamentally unsustainable regime due to its drive for endless
growth, profit maximization, and capital accumulation, proponents
of EM argue that the processes of modernization and capitalism
can be compatible with environmental priorities. The theory draws
upon the considerable progress of the environmental policies of
northern and western European countries while acknowledging
the merely moderate progress in North America (Buttel, 2000). Ear-
lier EM scholars advocate molding capitalist institutions to account
for environmental causes such as efficiency and externalities.
Christoff (1996) calls such an approach ‘‘weak” EM, representing
a corporate, technocratic solution to environmental problems. A
‘‘strong” EM should address the economical, systematic, commu-
nicative, deliberative, democratic, and international dimensions
of environmental institutions. More recently, EM has more deeply
examined the relationship between the state, civil society, and
capitalist corporations (Buttel, 2000).
Rather than viewing the state and the market as adversaries or
the state essentially as an enabler of capitalist accumulation, var-
ious strains of EM view the state as the ultimate arbiter of, and
facilitator between, different interests. It favors a consensus- and
negotiation-based rule-making process instead of a top-down
command and control process (Mol and Buttel, 2002; Jänicke,
1990; Mol and Spaargaren, 2002b). EM also rejects any universal
ideal for environment institutions and instead emphasizes com-
parative studies and unique pathways for countries. China features
prominently in the work of EM scholars such as Carter and Mol
(2007), Rock (2002), andMol (2006). China itself has also embraced
the vocabulary of ecological modernization in its official discourse,
although mostly focusing on its techno-economic rather than poli-
tical dimensions (Zhang et al., 2007, p. 665). EM has been criticized,
however, by neo-Marxists on the basis of its lack of concern for the
capitalistic drive for resource consumption and the associated
environmental impacts (Pred and Watts, 1992); by deep ecologists
for its anthro-centric bias; and by post-modernists for its uncritical
embrace of the discourse of modernization (Mol and Spaargaren,
2002a). Nevertheless, as an optimistic, pragmatic, and policy ori-
ented theoretical framework, EM provides insights into effective
practices in different social contexts and guidance for policy mak-
ers and environmental advocates in promoting sensible policy
changes. For China, it is particularly useful because EM is critical
of the top-down commanding approach of the state even as it
acknowledges its central roles. It offers paths for the state to
become an effective collaborator.
The global GB movement is a good example of an ecological
modernization project. It emerged after the oil shock of the
Fig. 1. International building energy consumption. Source: NRDC 2012.
3 The original plan for the survey aims for at least 10 completed questionnaires
from architect institutes in all provinces covering the entire coastal area and many
inland provinces. It turns out, however, that it is extremely difficult to collect
responses from less developed provinces, due to local unfamiliarity with the green
building concepts. As a result, provinces with more experience in green building had a
relatively higher proportion of respondents. While the survey was designed with the
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innovations and public policy changes in advanced capitalist
economies. Given that the state had already been institutionalized
in the construction sector through land acquisition protocols, plan-
ning ordinances, building codes, and other regulatory processes,
the incorporation of environmental mandates such as more
compact urban planning and efficient buildings is a natural
progression.
Internationally, the GB movement shows striking institutional
differences, exemplified by the United States, Germany, and Singa-
pore. The United States offers a market-driven example with indi-
rect governmental supports. The LEED (Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design) system developed by the non-governmen-
tal US Green Building Council in 1998 was first adopted by select
public agencies, but it has since developed a market appeal based
on its publicity value among corporations and organizations and
energy savings for property owners and tenants (Gauthier and
Wooldridge, 2012; Cidell, 2009a,b; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011;
Wiley et al., 2010). It also excels at creating an ‘‘ecosystem” of
accredited professionals that includes accountants, lawyers, con-
sultants, designers, planners, building material and equipment
suppliers, and builders. This network allows for the rapid dis-
semination of information, comprehensive technical support,
widespread promotion, and better accountability (Cidell, 2009a,
b). It has since become an international benchmark, used in 40
countries, with China ranking third in the total number of LEED
projects and second in gross square meters (USGBC, infographic-
LEED-World2). However, LEED has also been criticized because its
rating system is based on an assessment of the building design,
not on the actual energy use over the building’s projected life
(Brown, 2010). LEED’s reliance on technological solutions, corporate
leadership, and the market represents a largely corporate and tech-
nocratic approach to the environment (Knack, 2010). It is question-
able whether premium ecological enclaves of LEED buildings can
transform the unsustainable urban system (Hodson and Marvin,
2010).
European approaches differ from the North American one
because the EU countries have more powerful state apparatuses
for spatial planning and infrastructure construction; thus the state
assumes more instrumental roles in initiating and guiding the GB
movement (Newman et al., 2009; Urteaga, 2011; Wende et al.,
2010). Germany, for instance, has incrementally strengthened its
building energy code five times since 1977, each with more strin-
gent energy standards. The government-owned banks also provide
comprehensive technical and financial support for building energy
efficiency schemes (Schimschar et al., 2011; Buehler et al., 2011).
Germany’s construction industry developed energy-saving systems
that yield highly efficient buildings, exemplified by the Passive
House, a type of state-of-the-art building with ultra-low energy
consumption (Passive Housing Institute). Germany’s Green Party,
environmental NGOs, and a generally better-informed and more
engaged public all contribute to more effective environmental
governance, exemplifying the EM framework. Currently, the EU
has the lowest average building energy use per capita of all the
developed regions (Fig. 1). In 2010, the EU even adopted a directive
stating that all member states must lower all new construction to
‘‘near zero” levels of energy consumption by 2020 (Schimschar
et al., 2011).
In Asia, Singapore represents another extreme, in which the
state is direct and forceful. The powerful Building and
Construction Authority (BCA) – a branch of the Singaporean gov-
ernment – oversees all construction activities in Singapore.2 See Infographic: LEED in the world, http://www.usgbc.org/articles/infographic-
leed-world.Although its GB program (Green Mark certification) was launched
as recently as 2005, Singapore‘s target of 80% of its building stock
meeting the GB standard by 2030 is the most aggressive in the
world (Singapore Sustainability Blue Print, 2009). Through govern-
mental mandates on new construction and retrofits to existing
buildings, as well as incentives to developers, the number of GB
projects increased from 17 in 2005 to 1600 in 2013, which
accounts for 20% of the gross floor space in Singapore (BCA,
2013, Singapore Sustainability Blue Print, p. 46). However, it is
important to note that Singapore had built up its GB architectural
training capacity long before it mandated its GB program (Hwang
and Tan, 2012; Chan et al., 2009; Ofori and Kien, 2004).
These three examples reflect different articulations of state-
business-public partnerships, and they have all influenced China’s
GB approach. The LEED system was promoted earliest and was the
most influential on the GB standards for architects in China. Ger-
man companies dominate the premium segments of construction
in China as building material and technology suppliers and consul-
tants. However, China’s political system is most similar to Singa-
pore’s, with a centralized authority – the Ministry of Housing
and Urban and Rural Development (MOHURD) – overseeing most
of the non-industrial construction in China. MOHURD has thus
become the logical locus for China’s GB program.
The following section examines China’s GB program and its
prominent patterns. Approximately fifty interviews were conduct-
ed with governmental officials, real estate developers, brokers, and
property management firms between the summer of 2011 and the
winter of 2013 in Beijing, Shanghai, Dezhou in Shandong province,
Nanchang in Jiangxi province, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in Guang-
dong province, and Chengdu in Sichuan province. These locations
are selected to cover the core urban zones on China’s coast with
significant GB activities and two inland cities (Nanchang and
Chengdu) for comparisons. A database of China’s green buildings
stock was compiled based on online sources updated through early
2013. I also surveyed 121 senior architects in a stratified sample of
leading architecture design institutes in 13 major coastal cities,
Shandong province, and two of the largest inland cities, Xi’an and
Chengdu (Table 23). Within each institute, at most two senior archi-
tects were interviewed by telephone based on a questionnaire
regarding their GB experiences, practices and barriers.province as the basic geographical unit, most responses came from provincial capitals,
with Shandong province the only exception, because of the concentration of
architectural institutes in provincial capital cities. As a result, the distribution of
responses is not statistically representative of the entire architectural profession in
China, but it roughly reflects the geography of China’s green buildings (Table 2).
Fig. 2. Growth of green buildings, 2008–2012.
Fig. 3. LEED and China’s green building label.
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The decade of the 2000s marks the turning point for GBs in Chi-
na. Before 2000, governmental branches, research institutes, archi-
tects and NGOs had made experimental and haphazard exploration
into energy and water efficient construction techniques. As China
emerged as the largest CO2 emitter in the world, the Chinese gov-
ernment saw buildings as a venue to meet China’s international
pledge to lower its carbon intensity. Studies show that building
energy consumption in construction and maintenance in cities
accounts for 46.7% of the total energy consumed in China and
60% of the carbon emissions (Li et al., 2014; Mo, 2009). Presently,
China’s per capita building energy consumption is among the low-
est in the world, only one fifth that of Japan and South Korea and
one third that of the EU countries. However, this low consumption
is a result not of better building quality but of a low standard of liv-
ing. The thermal insulation building envelop in China is very poor
compared with those of developed countries (Li et al., 2014). The
densely populated areas in the southern half of China do not have
central heating, even though the average January temperature can
be below 0 C. The needs for winter heating in the south have
already generated intense debates (Li, 2013). As incomes rise, heat-
ing provisions and air-conditioning use will become more com-
mon. Without well-insulated buildings, the increased energy
consumption will greatly undermine the Chinese effort to reduce
air pollution and carbon emissions. The greening of China’s build-
ings is an urgent task.
The Chinese state has taken both mandatory and voluntary
measures to promote GB. Since 2000, MOHURD has increased the
mandatory energy conservation for new buildings, mandating
them to be 50–65% more efficient than the basic standard of the
1980s. In 2006, MOHURD issued its first voluntary GB rating sys-
tem, which measures the site planning, energy use, land use, water
conservation, and internal air quality (Zhou et al., 2011). It certifies
buildings on a scale of up to three stars, with three stars represent-
ing the best environmental performance. Provinces or provincial
level municipalities are responsible for evaluating the one- or
two-star projects, while the MOHURD certifies the three-star pro-
jects. The standards have been updated continuously and expand-
ed to include different types of buildings. To promote the GB
adoption rate, on January 1, 2013, the State Council issued the
Green Building Action Plan (China State Council, 2013 Action Plan
hereafter)4, which sets the goal that by 2015, 20% of all new build-
ings have to be green and that all newly built public buildings and
affordable housing financed by the state have to be green certified.
The 2-star and 3-star buildings will be eligible for state subsidies
and local planning priorities.5 The local governments are required
to develop their own action plans to at least be compatible with that
of the central government. China’s approach is thus similar to Singa-
pore’s in its staged goals and reliance on the state apparatus. How-
ever, China is not Singapore. The vast geographical scale comes
with greater climatic diversity and huge disparities in socioeconomic
development and governmental capacities, thus making GBs far
more challenging.
The state attention has had remarkable effects. Fig. 2 shows the
dramatic increase in the number of green building projects and
floor space in China after 2010. The LEED and GB labels are the
two most mainstream standards in China, but they are applied to
very different building types (Fig. 3). The LEED designation is seen
as a more prestigious, internationally approved badge of honor dis-
playing corporate social responsibility. It is especially attractive for4 See the link for details, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-01/06/content_2305793.
htm.
5 Press release of the green building action plan, http://news.dichan.sina.com.cn/
2013/02/27/658127.html.high-end offices and commercial complexes hosting foreign corpo-
rations and upper-class clientele, as well as prominent public land-
marks. The growth of LEED is moderate only because a growing list
of buildings is still going through the lengthy certification process-
es. The domestic GB standard is applied to more mainstream
residential and public buildings. In terms of both the number of
buildings and floor space, new GBs in 2012 have exceeded all the
previous years combined. The proportion of the ratings by number
of stars is approximately 3:4:3 as of early 2013 (author’s database).
Yet together, GBs remain a tiny fraction, not even reaching 1%, of
the gross floor space under construction in 2012.
The vast majority of China’s GBs are concentrated in the coastal
regions. The areas with a significant presence of GBs are either the
largest metropolises or their vicinities. The eight cities with the lar-
gest numbers of GB projects together comprised 57.5% of China’s
GB stock in 2012 while only constituting 0.7% of the total popula-
tion and 15% of the entire urbanized built area6. China’s three core
zones of development – the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River
Delta, and the Bohai Rim region – contain over 70% of China’s entire
green building stock (Fig. 4).
Chinese GBs also have a prominent luxury bias, which is due in
part to the early influence of the LEED system, which has morphed
into a luxurious corporate symbol in China. Most LEED buildings
are collections of state-of-the-art technology, such as the Grand
MOMA in Beijing, the first LEED gold building in China, and Vanke’s
headquarters in Shenzhen, rated as LEED platinum – both designed
by American architect Steve Holl. MOHURD wisely moved away
from the high-tech features of LEED by emphasizing passive tech-
nology, such as better-insulated windows and walls, external shad-
ing, green roofs, and natural ventilation and lighting. However,
most building professionals I interviewed, with the exception of6 Population figure is based on China’s 2010 Population census (National Bureau of
Statistics of China) and the Urbanized Area is based on the China Urban Construction
Statistical Yearbook (MOHURD, 2011).
Fig. 4. Distribution of green buildings in China in March 2013. Source: compiled from my own database, based on www.gbmap.org.
Fig. 5. Capital and Raffles City, Chengdu, by Steve Holl, 2007–2012, LEED gold.
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must come with signature technologies, such as solar roof tops,
and geothermal pumps. The perception is even more pronounced
in inland provinces. When asked to provide a good example of a
GB in Chengdu, the official from the Sichuan Construction Bureau
pointed to Raffles City, a newly built, LEED gold-certified commer-
cial/office complex also designed by Steve Holl. The flamboyant
complex features geothermal wells, rain water recycling ponds,
and high-performance glazing and energy efficient equipment.7 It
is also an upscale symbol of conspicuous consumption with human
spaces and local vegetation relegated to marginal positions (Fig. 5).
The engulfing scales – and sterile, cold, and geometric appearances
– make it difficult for the average observer to determine what is
so ‘‘green” about it. The luxury bias is so pervasive that a Beijing
city-planner bluntly asked why the government should promote
GBs because such buildings usually consume more energy.
China’s own GB label did not escape such bias, even though the
additional costs to meet the GB standard can be moderate with
wise technology choices (Yip et al., 2011; Sun and Shao, 2008).
Qiu (2013), the former head of the MOHURD, citing research from
213 GB projects, claims that the average increased cost of ‘building
green’ is ¥31/m2 for one-star housing, ¥88/m2 for two-star hous-
ing, and ¥196/m2 for three-star housing – all costs that can be
recovered in 2–6 years. Yet comparing 330 commercial green7 Based on description by Steve Holl Architects, http://www.stevenholl.com/
project-detail.php?type=housing&id=98.apartment units with the average of three conventional ones
nearby, I found that the green apartments cost on average almost
¥2000, or 20% more, and the management fee is 36% higher than
the conventional average (Table 1). Because the management fee
levels are typically correlated with the perceived status of a
particular residential complex, this indicates that green housing
complexes are built to be higher-end. The situation has improved
Table 1
Comparisons of green apartments vs. conventional apartments at the end of 2012. The
comparison excludes subsidized affordable GB apartments, which constituted an
insignificant proportion by then. The conventional prices are taken as an average of
three nearby apartment complexes based on soufun.com. The difference is statisti-
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2012 as GBs moved to areas with lower housing prices. The gaps
between green and conventional apartment prices shrank from
23% in 2009 to 18% in 2012 (price), and the management fees
dropped from 32% in 2009 to 29% in 2012; however, the gaps are
nowhere near closed. The luxury bias runs counter to the purpose
of GBs to reduce the building energy consumption. The higher
management fees offset the energy savings in GBs, thus undercut-
ting its incentives for ordinary tenants. The following section
explains the pattern of GB development by discussing it in the con-
text of China’s urban governance.8 See the link for details, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-01/06/content_2305793.
htm.The stake holders: bureaucracy, the market, building
professionals, and the public
State and contradicting incentives of Chinese local governments
There has been considerable debate on whether the state is a
good institution to implement genuine environmental programs.
Dryzek (1990, 1994) examines the roles of the administrative state,
capitalism, and liberal democracy as the three institutional nexus-
es of the western world to address the ecological crisis. He argues
that the administrative state has the benefit of a long-term vision
and a ‘‘distinctive claim to ecological rationality [that] rests on
its purported embodiment of common purpose, neutral expertise,
capacity to make sense of complex problems and the will and
authority to effect solutions to those problems” (1994, p. 180–
181). However, using Lindblom (1977)’s famous formulation of
the administrative state having ‘‘strong thumbs, [but] no fingers”,
Dryzek argues that the state is constrained for three reasons. First,
it is difficult to ensure compliance on the part of subordinates. Sec-
ond, rigid bureaucracy can only concentrate on a few limited tar-
gets or routines, and cannot address complex and variable
problems. The solution of one problem often leads to problems in
other areas. Third, hierarchical systems also have a natural tenden-
cy to obstruct the free transmission of information and resist the
institutionalization of learning derived from trials and errors
(1994, p. 181–182). James Scott (1998), a prominent critic of state
intervention, argues that the state often subscribes to a faith in
high modernism, which he describes as wanting ‘‘to use state pow-
er to bring about huge, utopian changes in people’s work habits,
living patterns, moral conduct and world view” (p. 5). This faith,
combined with authoritarian power, leads to social engineering
and intervention to enhance the legibility of the reality in the eyes
of the state. However, because interventions from above do not
give sufficient allowance for real, functioning social orders and
ignore practical knowledge, informal processes, and improvisation
in the face of unpredictability (p. 6), their efforts often end in
failure.While the Chinese state is often assumed to be monolithic,
direct and efficient, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) use the term
‘‘fragmented authoritarianism” to describe the policy implementa-
tion process in China:
‘‘Policy X resulted from a bargain among Ministry A, B, and C
and province D, . . .Disgruntled Ministries E and F, losers in the
deal, planned to pursue strategies to erode agreement. . . .The
bargain sought to reconcile the conflicting organizational
missions, ethos, structures and resource allocations of the
ministries involved. Thus, policies are not necessarily either
coherent or integrated responses to perceived problems or part
of a logical strategy of a leader or fraction to advance power and
principle.”
[p. 4]The Chinese GB program illustrates such problems. Two sets of
relationships are at the core of the Chinese administrative struc-
tures. The first is the relationships between the upper and low level
governmental branches. In Chinese, this relationship is referred to
as tiaotiao, or the vertical commanding system. The second is the
relationship between the different governmental branches at the
same level, referred to as kuaikuai, or horizontal coordination
among equal parties in the local area.
The central government makes strategic decisions based on
national interests. Given China’s resource insecurity, pollution,
and international pledge to reduce carbon intensity, a GB program
ought to be implemented as quickly as possible. The MOHURD is
the leading ministry for GB development within the central gov-
ernment. However, it is not the only ministry that matters in the
construction industry. The Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLR)
controls land allocation, while the Ministry of Finance (MOF) con-
trols taxes and finances for development. On top of these min-
istries, the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) is the only institution capable of coordinating ministries
and is tasked with approving major industrial and infrastructural
projects. While MOHURD can create building codes and GB stan-
dards, a national action plan would have to be endorsed by the
MOLR and MOF. These ministries would only comply if the NDRC
made the call. It has taken several years to get the NDRC on board
with GB development, so the Action Plan was issued by the State
Council and drafted by the NDRC and MOHURD8 with the support
of MOF.
The combination of these ministries and the NDRC in the central
government is replicated at the provincial level with provincial
branches charged with devising their own regional targets based
on the instructions from tiaotiao. However, setting any regional
target requires coordination among said branches through kuai-
kuai, which is dominated by local concerns. The Action Plan autho-
rizes the provincial governments to develop their plans, thus
granting them significant discretion. The result of negotiations
between tiaotiao and kuaikuai is that most provinces ratified the
‘‘hard” requirements in the Action Plan but had difficulties gener-
ating their own innovations. For example, by early 2014, 25 out
of 31 provinces/autonomous regions dutifully issued their own
action plans, with all but one replicating the mandatory measures
for state-funded buildings. The local incentive programs, however,
required additional coordination with other branches and financial
support, so only the six richest provinces offered financial subsi-
dies, and the four poorest provinces promised tax rebates or floor
space awards (Ma et al., 2014). The rest 15 provinces included only
weak provisions such as considering GBs for building awards or
adjusting floor space calculations to avoid inadvertently penalizing
Fig. 6. Alfa International Community, Nanchang, pictured in January 2013.
Fig. 7. Mantingchun-MOMA, Nanchang, pictured in January 2013.
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The commitment and enthusiasm at this level have already
dimmed.
The province, however, is only an intermediate layer – the most
important layer for GB implementation is the municipal one. This
is where the conflicts of interest between GB implementation
and economic development are the most intense. Municipal lead-
ers, often mayors, hold tremendous power over the local planning
apparatus and development projects. At this level, concerns over
carbon emissions and China’s energy security are remote, and the
supervising power of the central government is at its weakest.
Instead, local economic growth and the property market are the
overwhelming priorities for municipal leaders. Because land is
owned by the state, municipal governments can purchase farmland
at a low price from farmers, and auction the land to developers at a
far higher rate (Tian and Ma, 2009). These funds, called land lease
fees, are the single largest income (83% nationwide in 2010) for
local governments and the main financial source for urban projects
(Man, 2010; Wu, 1999, 2002; Borst, 2011). Land development
brings growth in the GDP, tax revenue, employment, and improved
public facilities, and it also improves the financial and trade statis-
tics, all of which will bring rewards to local officials. It is no wonder
that local governments care about them immensely (Economy,
2004; Mol and Carter, 2007; Richerzhangen and Scholz, 2008). In
Harvey’s terms, land development is the magic panacea for the ‘‘s-
patial fix,” not exactly for capital accumulation, but for govern-
mental revenue and bureaucratic careers.
While municipal governments could not completely ignore the
tiaotiao mandates, they have every incentive to ‘‘translate” green
building and eco-development into ‘‘building” and ‘‘development”
with a ‘‘green” façade. The heavy concentration of GBs on the
wealthiest coastal areas reflects the development priorities of the
local governments. Governments in these regions face stronger
pressures from the central government to reduce carbon emis-
sions, so they seek out GB as one way to comply. They also see
GB as an opportunity to expand markets for local products. Con-
struction can provide an effective demand for local industries
because building materials are bulky and more likely to be sourced
locally. Coastal cities have strong manufacturing industries, from
heating/cooling equipment to doors, windows, and solar panels.
Regional enthusiasm for GBs, is thus tied to upgrades of the local
industries. The Weifang City government in Shandong province,
for example, promotes solar thermal installation as the local GB
standard because it hosts one of the largest solar thermal compa-
nies. In less developed regions, however, similar industrial consid-
erations actually discourage GBs because the more expensive
building materials would have to be imported. Because less devel-
oped regions face less central government pressure to reduce their
carbon footprints, there is little interest to push for GB
development.
Real estate prices are also another key consideration. In rich
cities, high real estate prices ease the absorption of the additional
construction costs, and governments feel more confident to issue
higher GB standards. However, in less developed regions, the real
estate prices are lower, and governments are reluctant to force
additional costs for fear of upsetting the local real estate markets.
The luxury bias in GB can also be traced to the development pri-
orities of the local governments and the profit motives of the
developers. This can be illustrated by two projects in Nanchang,
the capital of inland Jiangxi province. The first project is the Alfa
International Community, designed by the American A+K architec-
ture firm based on the LEED standards, with high-tech features
such as geothermal pump, solar street lighting, Low-E windows,
external metal shades, an air circulation system, and an expensive
copper pipe system (Fig. 6). The complex guarantees a constant
indoor temperature through eight months of heating and coolingper year (in a province with no winter heating provision). The sec-
ond project is the Mantingchun MOMA (MOMA thereafter), the
first 3-star green building in Jiangxi, built by a leading Chinese
developer (Fig. 7). It also features a geothermal pump, well-insulat-
ed walls and windows, and rain collection and grey water recycling
facilities. Rather than offering a constant indoor temperature,
MOMA promises to moderate the extreme heat and cold during
four months of the year through floor heating and cooling systems.
These two projects are fairly compatible in terms of both the dis-
tance from the urban center and the neighborhood housing prices.
Yet, in the winter of 2013 when I visited Nanchang, prices in Alfa
averaged ¥13,000/m2, while prices in MOMA averaged ¥7500/m2.
Alfa also had much higher management fees (¥2.8/mo./m2 vs.
¥1.5/mo./m2) and heating/cooling costs. Both complexes sold well,
but Alfa, with its European style exterior and expensive interior
design, represents an exclusive upper class environment, while
MOMA is hardly distinguishable from the other nearby residential
projects. Indeed, units in MOMA are no more expensive than those
in the conventional complexes nearby. In this case, the more visi-
bly luxurious Alfa complex has a far higher profit margin, even
though MOMA is more sensible from an energy consumption per-
spective. Alfa is located in a new district (Honggutan) that the Nan-
chang government is currently promoting, while MOMA is located
in an urban infill. Luxury projects in the new district are more
attractive for the government because they raise the land lease
prices in the scarcely populated area.
Fig. 8. Barriers to green building development. Source: architect survey by author
Fig. 9. Housing price increase. Source: Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2012.
9 China’s Real Estate Bubble, CBS news, 60 min. March 3, 2013.
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ment has worried the Chinese central government due to mount-
ing local governmental debts, so the central government has
imposed developmental restrictions. Local governments thus seek
out GBs or eco-city projects to circumvent such restrictions. It is no
wonder that more than 200 Chinese cities have declared eco-city
plans (Chien, 2013). Rapoport (2014) suggests that such projects
are economically rather than ecologically driven. Indeed, GBs and
eco-cities are often the ‘‘fix” not only for capital accumulation
but also for circumventing the central government regulation
and macro-economic control.
Leverage in the real estate market
The involvement of business sectors is crucial for the GB pro-
gram, especially given that China’s property market is highly com-
mercialized. EM scholars advocate a shift from command and
control-minded state apparatuses to a more flexible and collabora-
tive relationship, more specifically, ‘‘from curative and reactive to
preventive, from exclusive to participatory policy making, from
centralized to decentralized wherever possible and from
domineering, overregulated environmental policy to a policy
which creates favorable conditions and contexts for environmen-
tally sound practices and behavior on the part of producers and
consumers.” (Buttel, 2000, p. 61). The goal is to make ‘‘the state
provides the conditions and stimulates socials’ self-regulation’
either via economic mechanisms and dynamics or via the public
sphere of citizen groups, environmental NGOs, and consumer orga-
nizations”. The relative success of European countries in reducing
their buildings’ carbon footprint suggests that the approach can
be productive.
Although the Chinese state does realize the importance of moti-
vating developers, it has yet to settle on an effective approach.
Today, China has over 800,000 developers of various sizes and ori-
gins, the vast majority of which are privately owned, for-profit cor-
porations (China Bureau of Statistics, compiled database). As
shown by Fig. 8, surveyed architects perceived a lack of interest
on the part of developers and clients to be among the top barriers
to GB development. A few of China’s leading developers, such as
Vanke, Wanda, MOMA, and LVDI are early supporters of GBs. Their
interests in GBs are due in part to personal values and brand build-
ing. Wang Shi, the charismatic founder of the largest housing
developer Vanke, is an avid mountain climber and a self-pro-
claimed environmentalist. Wanda, the largest commercial real
estate developer, is interested in the potential lifetime savings in
both the managerial and operational costs of the GBs because it
manages most of its own properties, as does Vanke. Some develop-
ers are also involved in GB to gain expertise in new building tech-
nology. These developers, however, represent a tiny minority. As
GB remains a voluntary program, most mid-level developers find
no particular reason to embrace it.
The growth of China’s GB program between 2008 and 2013 also
coincided with a speculative housing market, which has colored
the program’s implementation. Housing prices increased rapidly
in Chinese cities after 2003. Fig. 9 shows that after a temporary
hold during 2007–2008 due to governmental control measures,
prices took a speedy upturn in 2009, due largely to massive stimu-
lus spending and loose monetary policy designed to counter the
effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The stimulus injected a tremen-
dous amount of liquidity into the market, much of which ended up
flooding into real estate. In fact, researchers argue that this graph
may even under-estimate the housing price increase because it is
biased toward smaller cities and newly built areas away from
urban cores. Land prices have also appreciated at a rate of 20%
annually between 2004 and 2012, constituting the most important
driving force for rising housing prices (Wu et al., 2012). This sharpincrease compelled many urban middle- and upper-class families
to invest in multiple houses to preserve their savings or return
on investment. The result was a massive construction boom and
corresponding high vacancy rates (Barth et al., 2012). Across China,
many new towns, districts, and industrial development zones were
constructed, some of which became the notorious ‘‘ghost cities.”
Vast apartment blocks and districts have been established with
very few people actually living in them9 (Bar-On, March 3, 2013).
Many of these apartments were sold as second or third homes for
nearby city residents. Given the new towns’ distances from existing
urban centers and the lack of quality educational services and health
care infrastructure, it is unlikely that these apartments will be fully
occupied any time soon.
This speculative context severely distorted the incentive struc-
ture for stakeholders in the building industry, thus hurting the GB
drive. First, speculation rapidly drives up property prices, so that as
long as locations are desirable, apartments can be sold very quick-
ly. This certainty of sale reduces the competitive pressure for
developers to improve their stock. Interviews with developers,
major housing brokers, and real estate associations in Beijing all
confirmed that before 2003, developers were interested in green
technology to strengthen their sales, but that after 2003, few of
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design cycles and more customized approaches based on the site
and building specifics. Speculation, however, prioritizes the speed
and timing of the projects and downplays the value of creative
design. Under this time pressure, it is much easier for architects
to mass-produce conventional designs than it is to persuade devel-
opers to adopt innovative and customized green approaches. For
the end users, the attraction of GBs is a more comfortable lifestyle
with lower energy costs. However, if apartments are seen primarily
as investments and capital assets rather than places to live, home
buyers will not be as interested in the quality and energy perfor-
mance of their apartments.
In 2014, the highflying Chinese housing market suddenly cooled
down. Observers predict that the housing market will enter a long
period of moderate growth, if not outright collapse. If that is the
case, the market may provide more favorable conditions for better
quality housing. However, the sluggish housing prices and the
pressure of loan payments may also prevent small developers from
investing in green technology. In addition, if the building boom is
indeed over, it would mean that China’s GB drive has missed the
opportunity to incorporate environmental features in the largest
number of newly built buildings.
Given the reality of the housing market, the Chinese govern-
ment plans to motivate developers in two main ways: First, it man-
dates that all publicly funded projects have to meet GB standards,
and second, it authorizes local governments to provide subsidies
for 2- and 3-star buildings. In theory, subsidies could be used to
incentivize developers. However, developers in China have a dubi-
ous reputation and are widely seen as profiteers who gain at the
expense of the urban populace. Sending more money to developers
is thus politically unpopular. While the state approved subsidies
for GBs in 2012, no money was actually awarded for any individual
project by the end of the 2013, and in 2014, only six of the wealth-
iest provinces promised subsidies for higher rated GBs.
Interestingly, many of the developers that I interviewed were
not particularly enthusiastic about state subsidies either, reasoning
that they would not end up with much money because most of it
would vanish in the different layers of government. For developers,
there are more direct incentives that matter considerably more.
Singapore, for example, links high Green Mark ratings with land
allocation, with additional awards of 1% to 2% of the permitted
floor space/land ratio – something that many Chinese developers
would prefer because it would mean more apartment units to sell.
There are other localized approaches that can incentivize develop-
ers, such as reduced fees or tax rates from local governments, expe-
dited approval processes, land allocation priority, and favorable
financial terms. These methods are used in various countries and
some localities in China. Four of the least developed provinces in
China – Hainan, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia and Guizhou – lack the
financial resources of the coast and have opted for such approach-
es. However, this is not wide spread as the interviews suggest that
many officials find linking GB with an additional floor/land ratio to
be contentious within kuaikuai. The space/land ratio is controlled
by the local planning bureau and thus is outside the authority of
the local MOHURD branches. In the end, lacking a rich set of tools
to mobilize developers, most localities in China instead must rely
on ‘‘hard measures,” such as publically funded buildings, to meet
its ambitious GB goals. This severely limits the scale and environ-
mental performance of the GB program.
While the governments focus only on the financial subsidies,
there are other institutional opportunities to promote GB. For
example, in most Chinese buildings, the property management is
run by a third party, which discourages a long-term quality com-
mitment on the part of developers. Those developers most inter-
ested in GBs tend to be those who also manage their properties
because they are interested in the quality, durability, and opera-tional efficiency of the buildings. Now, as competition between
developers intensifies, more and more developers are establishing
their own property management branches. The MOHURD should
take advantage of this trend to normalize such an institutional
arrangement to motivate more developers to choose GBs.
Public awareness and participation
The most crucial element of the EM approach is public support,
especially to overcome the lack of information transparency inher-
ent in hierarchical systems (Dryzek, 1990). While the Chinese gov-
ernment’s Action Plan recognizes the role of the public, it provides
no roadmap for engagement. By relying mostly on the bureaucratic
channels, China’s GB projects become embedded in an urban gov-
ernance model that has almost no provisions for independent pub-
lic participation. The result is evident.
In contrast to the widespread name recognition of LEED labeling
in the United States, China’s green building label feels like a
best-kept secret. Given that the program is young, it is not entirely
surprising. However, in 2013, even many building professionals –
property brokers, staff members of governmental construction
commissions, property managers and architects – had not heard
about China’s green building label (you know how poor awareness
is when the senior managers of Beijing’s largest housing broker
agent admitted to having no knowledge about the label!). As for
public perception, GBs are often misunderstood as properties with
lots of green space. In fact, so few people have ever heard about the
label that certified GBs hardly bother to mention their certification
on real estate marketing websites.
This lack of public awareness about green buildings is not
caused by the indifference of Chinese homebuyers to the environ-
mental performance of their homes. In fact, interviews with archi-
tects and property brokers in Beijing suggest that the city’s
residents pay great attention to apartment orientation and natural
ventilation, as well as to non-toxic interior furnishings, the spacing
between buildings, and green space in the complexes, all of which
are taken into account by the GB label. The Chinese public is also
sensitive to energy costs, as they spend a higher proportion of their
income on energy than do people in developed countries. However,
there has been no effort to organize common environmental pref-
erences and concerns into public recognition of the GB label. A
leading green building expert, Mr. Wang Youwen, for instance,
believes that if Chinese homebuyers were better informed about
the heat-conducting index of walls and windows, market forces
would compel developers to install better insulation. The Chinese
government has made some efforts at public education. For exam-
ple, the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai featured GB technology, but
these were mostly high-tech features designed to impress the
audience rather than provide practical information for homebuyers
and tenants to evaluate the environmental performance of their
buildings. It is striking then, that with so much state attention
given to GBs, no effective publicity campaign regarding the GB
label or related knowledge about the benefits of green practices
has been undertaken.
At least one good example of public mobilization and education
in China does exist: The Shenzhen Institute of Building Research.
As a center for research and education on, and technological sup-
port for green buildings, the Shenzhen Institute provides an excel-
lent model for such efforts (Fig. 10). The Institute’s office building
has a three-star rating and represents a localized and participatory
approach to sustainable building design with an emphasis on pas-
sive technology. The building was designed in 2005 in a process
that started with an internal competition followed by external
bidding, and then incorporated public and expert inputs through
various public events, including input from LEED founder Robert
Watson. The building’s construction took place between 2006
Fig. 10. Shenzhen Architecture Science Research Institute office building.
Table 2
Experience with green buildings. The questionnaire was designed for provinces and
national-level cities, but because most of the answers in the provinces, with the
exception of Shandong, came from the provincial capitals, the table is listed as cities. I
removed Hubei province from the results because only one questionnaire was









# % # % #
Guangzhou 15 100 15 100 15
Shenyang 4 100 4 100 4
Shenzhen 4 100 2 50 4
Hangzhou 7 70 1 10 10
Beijing 10 67 7 47 15
Nanjing 6 60 5 50 10
Shanghai 8 53 2 13 15
Shandong 5 50 4 40 10
Chengdu 3 33 2 22 9
Xi’an 1 14 1 14 7
Fuzhou 0 0 0 0 11
Tianjin 0 0 0 0 10
Total 63 53 43 36 120
Fig. 11. Sources of green building information. Source: architect survey.
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solutions (IBR, 2009). The building now serves as a public educa-
tion venue and hosts group tours for both professionals and com-
munity members on a daily basis. It also provides comprehensive
technical support and solutions for green buildings in the Pearl
River Delta. Among major Chinese architectural institutes, IBR is
exceptional in its willingness to take on a leadership role in the
industry and engage with the public, while other similar institutes
view their roles primarily as consultants to the government. As a
result of IBR’s work, 90% of the architects that I surveyed in
Guangzhou and Shenzhen have been personally involved in
designing green buildings, while only approximately 25% of the
architects surveyed elsewhere had similar experience. This sug-
gests that China does not lack good examples of public engage-
ment; what it lacks is government commitment and skills for
public engagement.
Leveraging the knowledge network of building professionals
The environmental performance of buildings is determined by
the integration of many products and systems: architectural
designs, construction materials, heating and ventilation systems,
water systems, electrical systems, landscaping, construction and
maintenance protocols, and building management are all con-
tributing factors. Successful GB projects require intense communi-
cation and coordination regarding maintenance and services
among people with different expertise and responsibilities, both
during the construction process and throughout the buildings’ life-
times. This coordination suggests the importance of capacity build-
ing and knowledge sharing among building professionals, which is
best accomplished through mobilization in the professional net-
works. LEED, for instance has been particularly effective in creating
a knowledge network among building professionals that provides
technological advocates and support. My survey of senior archi-
tects in China, however, found that capacity building is only at a
nascent stage. Just over 50% of surveyed architectural institutes
in China’s developed regions have ever been involved in any GB
project. Among these institutes with green building experience,
about ¾ of them had GBs comprising less than 10% of their projects.
Only three institutes had GBs as more than 30% of their projects.
Among surveyed architects, only a third had been personally
involved with GBs. The regional survey sample of 10–15 is too
small to be reliable, but it still shows evident regional differences
(Table 2). In the richest regions – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Hangzhou and Shenzhen – the vast majority of architectural insti-
tutes have built at least one GB, whereas in the other regions, themajority of institutes have no experience with GB. Even in Beijing
and Shanghai, few architects have been personally involved in
designing GBs. The only exceptions are Guangzhou and Shenzhen,
both in Guangdong province, where all surveyed institutes and 90%
of architects had been involved in GBs. The survey also shows that
over 70% of surveyed architects readily acknowledged that their
lack of experience in GB represented a major barrier, an even high-
er barrier than the lack of qualified builders, building materials, or
technological maturity (Fig. 11).
The survey also shows that architects primarily receive infor-
mation about GBs through government mandates and personal
experiences, as well as through the requests of developers or
clients (Fig. 11). Formal education, foreign and domestic informal
networks, and conferences and trade shows, play only limited
roles. Interestingly, the survey shows that approximately 30% of
respondents consider mass media to be a very important source
of information, almost as important as education, and more so than
professional networking. These results suggest that professional
education and knowledge networks on GB have yet to emerge
and that the green buzz among professionals lags behind even
the public sphere.
Although they lack experience, Chinese architects do not lack
enthusiasm for GBs. When asked about whether they would
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recommend’ or ‘selectively recommend’. However, they also
acknowledged that the incentive structure in the real estate mar-
ket is not particularly conducive to promoting green buildings.
For example, design fees have not increased for over a decade,
despite the fact that building budgets have grown tremendously,
which discourages innovative design (interviews). The design time
cycles are also tight, as developers are always racing against time.
For example, one young architect in a large institute in Beijing said
that it is typical for him to be working on two dozen projects
simultaneously, most of which must be finished within half a year.
He inevitably ends up with mass produced blueprints, despite a
personal desire to do more creative job. Several overseas architects
working in Beijing also commented that the short time-cycle for
Chinese architectural firms undermines attention to the environ-
ment. Unlike the case of LEED, professional networks are a largely
untapped area for China to promote GBs.
In the end, capacity building in GB is a multifaceted process that
is governed by diverse institutions and conventions, while the
bureaucratic attention is limited to narrower targets and routines,
thus ‘‘strong thumbs, no fingers.” The EM approach suggests a
broad collaborative approach. The incorporation of public educa-
tion and technical support, as exemplified by Shenzhen’s Institute
of Building Research, and the extensive professional networks
developed by LEED, are all models from which the Chinese govern-
ment could learn.Conclusion
Compared to other countries, the Chinese GB program is unusu-
ally top-down and reliant upon bureaucratic hierarchies and appa-
ratuses for implementation. Whereas the system may have
succeeded at jump-starting a nationwide GB program, it has so
far failed to address the misaligned priorities of the national and
local governments as well as the distortions created by the
speculative property market. The limited impact of GBs in the
mainstream property market, their geographical unbalance, and
luxury bias, the lack of participation and enthusiasm among the
majority of developers, the ignorance of the public, and the dearth
of knowledge networks among building professionals are all symp-
toms of the underlying problems of the bureaucratic system.
The point of this paper is not to argue that a governmental
approach to the environment is fundamentally wrong. On the con-
trary, the fast growth of GB projects in China would not have hap-
pened without the Chinese state. Rather, I argue that a successful
institutionalization of environmental criteria requires the col-
laborative efforts of many stakeholders. In GB as well as in other
spheres, China is playing catch-up and intends to bend the learning
curve of greening the built environment. In the world’s oldest
bureaucracy with a strong central planning legacy, it is not surpris-
ing that China’s GB program gravitates to state command at this
initial stage. Yet, the heavy reliance on a state-centered approach
may prevent the program from achieving effective outreach. Ulti-
mately, the absence of any vocal opposition may allow, though
not assure, China to meet its GB goal in a record time, but such
an approach will be unable to create the collective environment
necessary for a quality and sustainable GB program. Bartlett
(2005) argues that the state needs to embrace dismantling and
transmogrifying changes from within to overcome its limitations
in solving environmental problems. Paehlke (1990) suggests that
‘‘[E]nvironmentalism cannot be successful in the long run without
a continuous enhancement of opportunities for democratic par-
ticipation” (p. 51). China’s experience in GB underscores the impor-
tance of coalition building in environmental institutions. The state
has to learn to leverage its power wisely by providing enforceableregulation, transparent governance, credible evaluation processes,
flexible incentives for developers, and a supportive environment
for public interests groups, academics, and market-oriented ser-
vices for GBs. Good examples already exist, both within and out-
side of China. Given China’s political economic regime, the EM
framework in China may differ considerably from those of western
countries both in form and in the speed of formation, especially
regarding a more powerful role for the state. Yet, as the GB pro-
gram shows, China can not be exempted from the rule that its eco-
logical modernization is ultimately tied to political modernization.
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